mie and other works, including Georgy Plekhanov's Osnovnye voprosy marksizma and Edward Carr's The Bolshevik Revolution, remarked: "No one considers this: all the revolutionary songs that have been sung in Turkey since the 1930s fail to correspond with the reality of Turkey. These songs are truly beautiful, and their words have deep meaning, but they are all translated from either Russian or Bulgarian. . . . Everything is translation. Ours is a MOVEMENT IN TRANSLATION. Nothing but an imitation [öykünmekten] ."1 Suda correctly understands translation as a constitutive characteristic and dynamic of Marxism and communism, but he regards it as inauthentic imitation, producing a particular, translated Marxism and communism that is hierarchically subordinated to an untranslated, potentially universal Marxism and communism.
Such views certainly do not stand alone in the long history of Marxist and communist translation dating back, in the Turkish case, to the early twentieth century and carrying the weight of a belated modernity as well as violent state exorcisms of the Left. which the Manifesto had been translated, Hüsnü observed that "this valuable work marking a crucial stage in the development of human thought was translated into our language and presented to Turkish intellectuals and the working class only now-seventy-five years after its composition-and is as such a great example of the calamitous circumstances under which we have lived until now."4 When Mehmet Selik's translation from the German of the first volume of Das Kapital was published in 1966, a review essay by the prominent critic and translator Selahattin Hilâv dwelled similarly on its belatedness.5 Selik's translation had followed Hikmet Kıvılcımlı's unfinished effort to translate the first volume in serial form in the late 1930s, relying on the popular German edition of 1932 issued by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute. Kıvılcımlı's translation appeared in seven serial installments, with the seventh installment ending in the middle of a sentence upon Kıvılcımlı's arrest and imprisonment in 1937. 6 It is understandable that the interruptions and deferrals produced by censorship and by the persecution of translators would encourage those who suffered them to imagine Marxist and communist translation as specially cursed by belatedness and inauthenticity, in Turkey and elsewhere. But we think it is time to examine this discourse more carefully, and one of our goals in this special issue has been to imagine translation as an event of iteration that is requested and anticipated by the "original" works of the Marxist-Leninist corpus itself. To imagine translation as mere derivation is to leave it confined by what Walter Benjamin called "the bourgeois conception of language," which regarded language principally or only as a means of communication and regarded translation in similar terms, as the reproduction at a distance of an abstract content of communication that was always identical to itself.7 Resisting or simply turning away from the singularity of each translation, the bourgeois conception of translation abstracts from the source text a universalized or universalizable conceptual content and understands any given product of translation as an instance of such abstraction. As such, it recapitulates the governing logic of the commodity form, which establishes the relation between the universal and the particular as a relationship of essential identity.
Against the chrono-logic of belatedness and the onto-logic of sameness, in these senses, we posed as our organizing question the following: How does the Marxist-Leninist oeuvre lend itself to and "call" for translation, and how do the languages of translation respond to, rather than merely exemplify or serve (a universal) Marxism and communism? In challenging attributions of derivativeness to translation, we take our cue from Benjamin, who imagined translation as a form and translatability as a characteristic of the original text itself. "If translation is a form [Form] ," he wrote in his 1921 essay "The Task of the Translator" ("Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers"), "translatability [Übersetzbarkeit ] must be an essential feature of certain works . . .
[which] means that a specific significance inherent in the original manifests itself in its translatability."8 In an essay explicating this formal or formalist image of translation, Samuel Weber argues that in Benjamin's usage, the suffix form -ability (-barkeit) in the word translatability (Übersetzbarkeit) marks translation as a structural possibility and indeed a necessity inherent in the original itself, in just this sense.9 If, according to the bourgeois conception of translation, what "moves across" in translation is a self-identical conceptual content, Benjamin contrastingly understands the event of translation as a structurally necessary event-and that is what is communicated.
In like manner, Marxist-communist translation in particular marks a necessary "relationship of the original to itself," in its iterations: each event of translation is, then, a self-realization of the original text in its taking leave (of itself) and becoming an other. Not a closed, self-identical totality, the original is imagined as a whole comprised of its (realized and possible) translations-a whole that resembles the assembled fragments of a broken vessel, whose broken pieces "must match one another in the smallest details, although they need not be like one another."10 Here we might consider the remarks of Kıvılcımlı, in a 1978 essay titled "Geç Gelme" ("Arriving Late"), on the belatedness of the Turkish communist movement, In thus insisting on translation, one might say that we are resisting a recent tendency in comparative literary studies to valorize untranslatability. Revisiting the oft-cited account by Marx and Friedrich Engels in the Manifesto of the emergence of Weltliteratur from an intensified intercourse (Verkehr ), Emily Apter has observed the dependence of the revival of world literary studies during the 2000s "on a translatability assumption." Against this "expansionism and gargantuan scale of world-literary endeavors," Apter proposes a comparative method that "recognizes the importance of non-translation, mistranslation, incomparability, and untranslatability."12 Apter's most recent work must be read alongside the English translation of Barbara Cassin's Vocabulaire européen des philosophies: Dictionnaire des intraduisibles, coedited by Apter with Jacques Lezra and Michael Wood, which borrows and modifies Cassin's concept of an "Untranslatable."13 For Cassin, "to speak of untranslatables in no way implies that the terms in question, or the expressions, the syntactical or grammatical turns are not and cannot be translated: the untranslatable is rather what one keeps on 11. Hikmet Kıvılcımlı, "Geç Gelme," (not) translating."14 But we find that Apter's version of the Untranslatable, despite her clarifications, too often appears to stand for a pure difference, and thus risks a double marginalization in its otherwise noble opposition to the "always translatable."15 One cannot end with the Untranslatable as illegible: rather, as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak has suggested, one must continue from that waypoint, to reclaim the singularity of the untranslatable as a universalizable, without actually universalizing it.16 In the case of Marx, whose writings may all too conveniently be construed as prophecies that lost their historical force in mistranslation (among other misfortunes), we might say that our obligation today is to translate Marx more extensively and more vigorously-not despite but precisely because of Marx's inexhaustible translatability. Insofar as an ostensibly original Marx, or Marxism, has always exceeded its historical realization, we ought to affirm its difference as a universalizable, in Spivak's sense, and to imagine another politics of translation for the so-called postcommunist historical present.
We affirm Cassin's foregrounding of the "interminable" character of translation in general, and we suggest its application to Marxist-communist translation in particular. The essays that follow represent work across European and Asian languages including German, French, English, Dutch, Russian, Chinese, Korean, Arabic, Azeri, and Turkish; in such work "from one language to another," as Cassin put it, "neither the words nor the conceptual networks can simply be superimposed" (DU, xvii). It is a given, not a revelation, in such a context, that translation "into one language or another," as Cassin also put it, "creates a problem, to the extent of sometimes generating a neologism or imposing a new meaning on an old word" (DU, xvii). Tracing the English (mis)translation of Marx's phrase ursprüng-liche Akkumulation as "primitive accumulation," Rosalind C. Morris suggests that mistranslation of this concept has supported evolutionary or developmentalist accounts of national and epochal history. Morris suggests "originary accumulation" as a rendering that conveys the recursive dimension of ursprüngliche Akkumulation, as a process that is reenacted in the life-history of not only every economic system but also every subject. Reminding us that "ursprüngliche Akkumulation" was Marx's own German rendering of Adam Smith's "previous accumulation," Morris intimates that translation is not an afterlife of Marxist-communist texts but a constitutive force that impels them from the start.
In their respective essays on the Chinese and Turkish communist translators Qu Qiubai (1899-1935) and Hikmet Kıvılcımlı (1902-71) , Tani Barlow and Özge Serin shift focus to historical contexts, in which the project of Marxist-communist translation was doubly complicated by the radicalization of the instability in language under the influence of early twentiethcentury Chinese and Turkish lexical, orthographic, and writing reforms. Barlow suggests that for Qu, who played a key role in the institutionalization of sociology in China as a Marxist discipline, the hanzi, or old written Chinese language, resembled "an undead zombie or a filthy ghost" that posed a major obstacle to Marxist translation.17 Against this inaccessible language that offered fake, petit bourgeois representations of reality, Qu proposed cultivating a "common" written language-common in the sense of "common as dirt" (QQ, 284)-based on the aphorisms, localisms, and idioms of all varieties of spoken Chinese. 18 According to Serin, it was to achieve a similar end that Kıvılcımlı insisted on the idiomatic use of Marx's concepts in his Turkish translations. What mattered for Kıvılcımlı was not only the actual use of idioms but also the reconceptualization of Marxist-communist translation itself according to the logic of the idiom: the inseparability of language and thought, of form and content, that alone makes possible the singular use of idioms in their commonality. Through a close reading of Kıvılcımlı's preface to his translation of Marx's Wage Labor and Capital, Serin suggests that Kıvıl-cımlı's idiosyncratic, literalist method of translation not only traced Marxian concept-metaphors back to their sensuous origins, exposing the use-value of abstractions for the immediate grasping of historical materiality, but also called for the singular use of Marxian concept-metaphors by anyone and everyone as if they were idioms, putting into practice a new kind of literary communism.
In "Lenin of the Camps: Radical Translation in Colonial Digoel and Nazi Terezín," Rudolf Mrázek offers a contrapuntal reading of the Nazi con- centration camp at Terezín (Theresienstadt), established in Bohemia for European Jews, and the Dutch colonial camp Boven Digoel, established in New Guinea for the imprisonment of Indonesian communists. Tracing the translation and "massive borrowing" of Marxist-communist texts in both camps, Mrázek emphasizes not only the translational gaps between languages-for example, in the Dutch translation of soviet as raad ("council")-but also the translation and translatability of what seems most untranslatable: the proper names Lenin, Sovieta, and so on given to children born in the camps. Collecting what he calls, quoting Walter Benjamin, the "rags of speech and verbal scraps" of these archives, Mrázek suggests that the translating activities of the imprisoned gave to the "original" texts a new kind of revolutionary code or "concentrated" language. If what emerges in the interstices of idioms, code, and other fragmentary utterances in Mrázek's essay as well as across the whole collection is a kind of a Benjaminian pure language, this plurilingual relationality ought to be affirmed, as Mrázek suggests (via Jacques Derrida), as the mark of an undeconstructible communist promise that one cannot stop (not) translating.
Marx as Translator
If our first goal in this special issue is to displace the derivative conceptualization of Marxist-communist translation, a second is to foreground translation as both a concept-metaphor and a practice in Marx's own work. Even a quick glance at the published volumes of Marx and Engels's reading excerpts and notes in the fourth division of Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe (MEGA) suggests a constitutive role for translation. While Marx's earliest notebooks, which include extracts in ancient Greek and Latin on Epicurean philosophy and the work of Gottfried Leibniz and Baruch Spinoza, among others, reveal his solid knowledge of classical languages, the reading notes Marx kept in 1844 on Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, and David Ricardo, among others, suggest that translation was a methodological condition of the Marxian critique of classical political economy.19 The 1844 notebooks that provided the foundation for The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 and Capital reveal that Marx was reading and abstracting English texts in French translation prior to gaining facility in English during the 1850s, and that Marx translated some passages into a kind of Germanized French.20
It is well known that Marx composed Misère de la philosophie in French in 1847 and that he revised and rewrote Joseph Roy's French translation of Capital, published in installments from 1872 to 1875, making corrections as well as simplifying the text for a readership of French workers. In January 1853, Marx began composing his articles for the New York Daily Tribune in English, no longer requesting that Engels either translate them from German or write them on his behalf.21 In addition to studying Spanish and Italian, Marx in his fifties acquired reading knowledge of Russian, writing to Sigfrid Meyer in a letter composed in English and dated January 21, 1871, I don't know whether I told you that since the beginning of 1870 I have been having to teach myself Russian, which I now read fairly fluently. . . . The result was worth the effort that a man of my age must make to master a language differing so greatly from the classical, Germanic and Romance languages. The intellectual movement now taking place in Russia testifies to the fact that things are seething deep below the surface. Minds are always connected by invisible threads with the body of the people.22
Such rigorous plurilingualism, with its commitment to ongoing language acquisition, was also characteristic of Engels and, later, Vladimir Lenin: in addition to classical and modern European languages, Engels studied Persian, Russian, and Serbo-Croat, while Lenin learned German, French, and English in addition to classical European languages. 23 We have already mentioned Morris's essay, in which we encounter the figure of Marx as translator, working across English, German, and French. It might be productively read alongside Dermot Ryan's "Marx's It is useful to recall that Althusser distinguished two modes of reading in Marx. In the first mode, Marx emphasized classical political economy's oversight or omission of essential matters: its blindness; while in the second, Marx foregrounded what classical political economy had seen but failed to name: its silent vision. For Althusser, the "religious," logocentric mode of reading employed in the Paris manuscripts, interpreting concrete existence as the "immediate transparency" of an abstract (human) essence, was devoted to the detection of blindness (RC, 17; LC, 13). The detection of silent vision, meanwhile, is a goal of the second mode of reading, the "structural" mode employed in Capital, which "measures a distance and an internal dislocation (décalage) in the real, inscribed in its structure, a distance and a dislocation such as to make their own effects themselves illegible, and the illusion of an immediate reading of them the ultimate apex of their effects: fetishism" (RC, 17; LC, 14). Following Ryan, we might challenge the Althusserian insistence on a characteristic break in Marx's work, instead reading symptomatically Althusser's own reading of Marx and suggesting that translation is the missing problematic in Althusser's explication of Marx's reading "protocol." One might examine the extract quoted by Althusser from the nineteenth chapter of the French edition of Capital, translated by Roy and edited by Marx (RC, 21; LC, 19), on the transformation of the value (and respectively the price) of labor-power into wages. Tracing classical political economy's determination of the real value of labor by the accidental market prices of labor, Marx notes that classical political economy "then determined this value by the value of the subsistence goods necessary for the maintenance and reproduction of the labourer." Marx observes and Althusser emphasizes that classical political economy thus pointed toward the concept of labor-power but that in its exclusive preoccupation "with the difference between the current prices of labour and its value, with the relation of this value to the values of commodities, to the rate of profit, etc." (quoted in RC, 21; LC, 19), classical political economy failed to name and develop what it saw.26 Marx was able to name the missing concept, calling it Arbeitskraft, and we follow Ryan in suggesting that the act of translation is a condition of possibility for the critical epistemology that appears here.
Although Althusser does not comment on it, the work of translation animates every turn in Marx's parsing of the logic of classical political economy in the passage in question. Marx refers to "le 'prix nécessaire' des Physiocrates,-le 'prix naturel' d'Adam Smith" (quoted in LC, 18), then translates a sentence from Smith: "'La marchandise,' dit Smith, 'est alors vendue précisément ce qu'elle vaut '" ("'The commodity,' says Smith, 'is then sold for precisely what it is worth'") (quoted in LC, 19; RC, 21). In the 1867 German original, Marx's role as a translator is also marked by the appearance of the English phrase "value of labour" in a crucial sentence: "Was sie also Werth der Arbeit (value of labour) nennt, ist in der That der Werth der Arbeitskraft, die in der Persönlichkeit des Arbeiters existirt, und von ihrer Funktion, der Arbeit, ebenso verschieden ist, wie eine Maschine von ihren Operationen."27 ("Therefore what they called 'the value of labour' is in fact the value of labour-power, as it exists in the personality of the worker, and it is as different from its function, labour, as a machine is from 26 Such repetition by translation estranges the original encountered in French and/or English, exposing a gap between the name of the concept and the place it occupies, or the role it serves, in the signifying chain of classical political economy and requesting its supplementation in a translating language, German. Via Weber and Benjamin, we remember that translation can never "be equated with the sum of the meanings of individual words and phrases" (BA, 73); it also concerns "the way in which the individual elements are syntactically related or positioned with respect to the other elements of the phrase" (BA, 77). Here we might borrow Althusser's analogy, noting that there is indeed "the action of a real drama" in the texts of classical political economy, "in which old concepts desperately play the part of something absent which is nameless, in order to call it onto the stage in person-whereas they only 'produce' its presence in their failures, in the dislocation between the characters and their roles" (RC, 31; LC, 31). It is precisely the repetition of this epistemological production (as a kind of relational drama) in another language that exposes the gap between the name of the concept and its role in the original language, allowing for its supplementation in a translating language. Irreducible to mere mechanical repetition, Marx's translations register in this way the limits of the discourse on derivative translation that we mentioned earlier.
But in Marx's work translation is not only an actual practice. It also serves as an important concept-metaphor in the first chapter of Capital, describing a process inherent in and at the origin of the capitalist constitution of reality. Appearing in a world of commodities, each commodity "betrays [verrät ] its thoughts in a language with which it alone is familiar, the commodity-language [der Warensprache]" (C, 143; translation slightly modified).28 Eavesdropping on a conversation between one commodity, linen, and another commodity, a coat, that have "entered into association with one another," Marx translates their exchange thus:
In order to tell us that labor creates its own value in its abstract quality of being human labor, [the linen] says that the coat, in so far as it counts as its equal, i.e. is value, consists of the same labor as it does itself. In order to inform us that its sublime objectivity as a value differs from its stiff and starchy existence as a body, it says that the value has the appearance of a coat, and therefore that in so far as the linen itself is an object of value [Wertding] , it and the coat are as like as two peas. (C, 143-44; K, 66-67)
More than merely a reference to a figurative act of speech, the term commodity-language denotes a kind of language that predicates and is predicated on the world of commodities. Analyzing the grammar, syntax, and semantics of this commodity-language, in the exchange between the linen and the coat, Werner Hamacher observes that it is restricted to propositions of equality.29 Hamacher further notes that its "statements are not propositions of existence but arithmetical propositions of relation which can claim validity even if the existence of one of their members is not assured" (GD, 170). Insofar as the statements of the commodity-language posit an equivalence where there is none, they are performative: it is in fact this equivalence that brings the commodity into the world, making it appear in the world of commodities. Finally, Hamacher suggests, because the commodity-language "disregards all 'natural' determinations and relies exclusively upon those formal determinants pertinent to its abstract relation of symmetry, it is not only a language of exchange but also a language of turning, of reversal, of specular inversion" (GD, 171). Hamacher emphasizes the abstraction of the commodity-language, which represents the value of one commodity (the linen) by the body of another equivalent commodity (the coat) in the statement of equivalence "20 yards of linen = 1 coat." In order to appear as a commodity, the linen must negate its materiality as linen and sublimate itself into a "value-soul" (Wertseele) expressed only in the physical form of the coat. And in its value-relation with the linen, the coat matters only insofar as it serves as the "value-body" (Wertkörper ) for the linen's "value-soul" (C, 143; K, 66; translation modified).
We might extend Hamacher's emphasis on the "turning" (Verkehrung) quality of such abstracting language, suggesting further that the commodity-language is structured as translation. Insofar as translation involves an original that takes leave of itself and becomes another (or more than itself) in its re-presentation in the phonic and graphemic signifiers of another language, the statements of the commodity-language might well be read as translational statements themselves: the value of the linen is abstracted from its body and expressed by its translation into the physical form of the coat. And insofar as the coat serves as the medium of translation for the "value-soul" of the linen, it is transformed into a new kind of animated body-form-one that we might describe, following Hamacher, as a "morphantom" (GD, 178).
Working as a critical translator of this language, Marx reveals the content of the "value-soul" mediated by the commodity-language: it is the magnitude of the socially necessary labor-time that goes into producing the linen and the coat, and that is itself an abstraction from the particular forms of human labor producing each item, in weaving and tailoring. But Marx's critical translation has a dual character, involving more than a mere revelation of content. Equally important is his emphasis on the unheimlich translational form of the commodity-language that "transforms every product of labor into a social hieroglyphic" or enigma (C, 167; K, 88). "Whence, then, arises the enigmatic character of the product of labour, as soon as it assumes the form of a commodity?" Marx asks. "Clearly, it arises from this form itself" (C, 164; K, 86; emphasis added). The commodity form possesses a fetish character because it conceals its true content in and through the peculiar materiality that it dons, as it were, in translation. Here the translating medium does not merely alter but actively veils its content, as it is itself radically transformed.
If the genealogy of Western translation theory might be traced back to ancient theories of metempsychosis, we might say that here a Seelenwandrung, or soul migration, occurs in translations of the commoditylanguage.30 Irreducible to a mere thing, the commodity is indeed an animated body-form, a "morphantom," that signifies above and beyond its sensuousness as the bodying forth of a social relation, the specter of social labor. Imbued with souls captured from working human bodies, incarnated commodities act as if they are the sources and origins of their own movement in the social sphere, obscuring the relations of production that produce and animate them. As Marx observes, "The mysterious character of the commodity-form consists therefore simply in the fact that the com- modity reflects [zurückspiegelt ] the social characteristics of men's own labour as objective characteristics of the products of labor themselves, as the socio-natural properties of these things. Hence it also reflects the social relation of the producers to the sum total labour as a social relation between objects, a relation which exists apart from and outside the producers" (C, 164-65; K, 86). Where the objective language of capitalist relations organizes reality in and as a concealment, veiling not just the real but also its own mode of translation as concealment, Marx's practice of critical and, arguably, interlinear translation exposes the dual structure of translation inherent in the commodity-language and its animated forms of self-concealment.
Thus while for Althusser the "necessary invisible connexion between the field of the visible and the field of the invisible" in Marx ought to be read as "the effectivity of a structure on its elements," we might instead place emphasis on the transformative dynamic of this relation, reconceptualizing it as a dual structure of translation (RC, 20, 30; LC, 18, 30). More than a merely phenomenological question of (in)visibility, fetishism is also, then, a hauntological question of alteration.
This emphasis on translation also allows us, pace Althusser, to account for the reproductive expansion of capitalist objectivity across different linguistic and social formations without making the history a question of only secondary importance. Morris's reflection on ursprüngliche Akkumulation offers the alternative translation "originary accumulation" as the recursive form of the historical translation of capitalist relations across different historical and social formations at both the subjective and objective levels. Her essay helps us to account for the universalizing and particularizing forces of capitalist modernity, refusing to approach non-European modernities as mere imitation or essentialize their difference as alternative modernities. In focusing on the domestic space of the family and the household as the originary site of this historical translation, across mainland Southeast Asia and South Africa, Morris suggests that capitalism's parasitic consumption of the use-value of labor-power and the household reproduces and produces anew not only the desiring subjects of household consumption (and debt) but also the desiring subjects of production "freed" into wage labor.
But there is one more crucial use of the concept-metaphor of translation in Marx's writings: Ryan demonstrates that Marx repeatedly employed the concept-metaphor of translation in his criticism of the distorted "translational" practices of vulgar economists. Distinguishing vulgar economists from political economists, Marx noted in The Economic Manuscript of 1861-63 that the former "translate [übersetzen] the concepts, motives, etc., of the representatives of the capitalist mode of production who are held in thrall to this system of production and in whose consciousness only its superficial appearance is reflected [in denen sie sich nur in ihrem oberflächlichen Schein reflectirt ]."31 If vulgar economists offer merely "doctrinaire" and "apologetic" translations of "commonplace appearances into equally commonplace notions," political economists "seek to uncover the essence which lies hidden behind commonplace appearances,"32 but they lack the critical capacity to confront the necessary condition of their own production. Following Ryan's analysis of vulgar and classical economists' possessed immersion in the language of capital, one might say that ideology for Marx is a debility in self-translation and that this failure to retranslate concepts back into their material origins bespeaks the "blindness" of ideology to itself. Earlier, we suggested that Marx himself only uses concepts that are historically available and that he responds to this "first language" instead of creating abstractions ex nihilo. He often ventriloquizes the language of classical political economy in his uncompromising refusal to adopt a transcendental critical position, enjoining his readers to provide missing quotation marks. This both descriptive and performative ventriloquism should be distinguished from the speech-acts of vulgar economists, who are merely spoken by the commodity-language. Against the echoes of bourgeois ideology in vulgar and classical economy, Marx outlined his own critical translational methodology in the well-known 1857 introduction to Grundrisse:
The concrete is concrete because it is the compilation [Zusammenfassung] of many determinations, hence unity of the diverse. It appears in the process of thinking, therefore, as a process of compilation, as a result, not as a point of departure, even though it is the point of departure in reality and hence also the point of departure for observation [Anschauung] and conception [Vorstellung] . Along the first path the full conception was distilled out [verflüchtigt ] to yield an abstract determination; along the second, the abstract deter- The first form of abstraction is, of course, the conventional method of political economy, which begins with the "real-concrete" as if it were immediately present to itself, as if it were not the product-effect of a historical process. Political economy abstracts from this apparent immediacy to a generalized law, establishing an inner unity between appearances. Marx's rejoinder to this formal abstraction is to posit the concrete as a "result" and abstract toward the mediated reality in the "thought-concrete."34 Marx's reverse translation seeks to ground anew the relationship between concept and reality, concept and truth, and concept and politics, formulating a new understanding of abstraction that is neither homoeosis nor adequation but rather, as Antonio Negri suggests in Marx beyond Marx, a political "project."35 From Marx's perspective, political economy's formal abstraction is obfuscatory rather than clarifying: political economy grasps the antagonistic, hence necessarily dynamic and incomplete material reality of capital with immutable, closed, and unified categories, positing capital as an autonomous, self-generative Subject. Against this projection, Marx insists that we leave abstractions open and recognize their heterogeneous determination. It is through such an approach that we radicalize the antagonism inherent in material reality.36 No doubt Marx had this in mind when he began his examination of real abstractions with a sentence whose senti- ment might appear to have arrived intact from political economy, but which took on a very different, if not diametrically opposed, meaning in transit: "Here, then, for the first time, the point of departure of modern economics, namely the abstraction of the category 'labour,' 'labour as such,' labour pure and simple, becomes true in practice. The simplest abstraction, then, which modern economics places at the head of its discussions, and which expresses an immeasurably ancient relation valid in all forms of society, nevertheless achieves practical truth as an abstraction only as a category of the most modern society."37
It is only when abstraction is not reduced to adequation to or "verification" of material reality,38 Marx maintains, that critical epistemology can bring to crisis the categories of capital riven by contradictions and disproportions, opening their constitutive antagonism to a new political horizon. It is in its exposure of the antagonistic mediation of reality that the Marxian concept of translation may be understood as the condition of a new politics.
Lenin and Translation
In his afterword to Revolution at the Gates, Slavoj Žižek suggested that "to put it in brutal and direct terms: it is obvious that 'Lenin did not really understand Marx'-if nothing else, the Hegelian complexity of Marx's 'critique of political economy' was beyond his reach; the paradox, however, is that it is only because Lenin did not 'understand Marx' that he was able to organize the October Revolution, the first properly Marxist revolution."39 Treating Lenin similarly as a revolutionary (non)translator of Marx, the third main goal of this special issue is to trace the dynamics of Leninist translation in the Soviet Union and beyond.
In "North Korea's 'Succession' of Marxism," Hoon Song revisits these remarks by Žižek, suggesting that Lenin's creative translation of Marx has its own roots in Marx's work. Of essential importance, Song suggests, is the analogy Marx draws between the equivalent form and the person of sovereign monarchical power. Emphasizing that the equivalent form of the coat "holds good only within the value-relation, in which the commodity linen is related to the commodity coat as its equivalent," Marx proposed the following comparison in his analysis of the commodity relation between linen and coat: "For instance, one man is king only because other men stand in the relation of subjects [Untertanen] to him. They, on the other hand, imagine that they are subjects because he is king" (C, 149; K, 72). Locating in this Marxian "digression" the true political content of capitalist relations, Song suggests that the forms of capitalist economic exchange embody or represent (in the sense of darstellen) immeasurable difference as equivalence, concealing the historical conditions of their emergence. In addition to their fetishistic objectivity, these forms are supported by ideological temporalizing narratives (Vorstellung) that are invented after the fact to cover over and legitimize the rupture of exchange. For Song, Marx's analytic method is telling in itself: rather than seeking the "missing representation" of capital's historical inception, Marx approaches "capitalist history in terms of the Darstellung of cuts, fault lines, or faces." Marx's intervention thus involves appropriating "that dissimulated or covered-over transit distance of immensurability called 'antagonism'" immanent in the form, so as to free oneself from the order of general equivalence.40 The Marxian intervention is a refusal to let one's inner truth be bound to and effectively canceled by the sovereign, fetishistic exteriority (or "faciality") of an equivalent other. Song suggests that if Lenin succeeded in translating Marx, he did so by repeating the Marxian gesture of arresting history, appropriating the immeasurable power of subjugation to perform a sovereign revolutionary act. A similar translation might be observed in Kim Il Sung's "creative succession" of Marxism-Leninism: Song suggests that although the West reduces North Korean national politics to an irrational cult of the leader, the philosophy of Juch'e (self-reliance) composed by Kim Il Sung is a preparation toward authoring one's own singular event and encountering knowledge in one's own existence.
In its valuable analysis of the semiotics of "self-reliance" in North Korean political thought, Song's essay also contributes to a recent conversation in Marxist criticism formulating interventions in contemporary politics through a return to the Lenin of the war years, who took the historical crisis of imperialist war and the disintegration of socialist alliances as an opportunity to reinvent Marxism.41 If this Marxist conversation does not have much to say about the legacies of Lenin in Asia, one of our goals here is to trace the other birth of the Leninist act in translation across Asian languages. We should remember that the proper names "October Revolution" and "Lenin" marked the place of a "knowledge to come" for many "Eastern" revolutionaries, in much the same way as Marx himself did for Lenin, mediating the translation and dissemination of Marxism-Leninism into Asian languages.42
Žižek's Revolution at the Gates is a valuable collection of Lenin's writings from February through November 1917, representing a Lenin in the making of the revolutionary act. "With Lenin, as with Lacan," Žižek writes, "the point is that the revolution ne s'autorise que d'elle-même: we should venture the revolutionary act not covered by the big Other-the fear of taking power 'prematurely,' the search for the guarantee is the fear of the abyss of the act" (RG, 8). Excluded from Žižek's collection is the "Appeal to All Toiling Muslims of Russia and the East" ("Obrashchenie ko vsem trudiashchimsia musulʹmanam Rossii i Vostoka"), which Lenin cosigned with Joseph Stalin on December 7, 1917 . We contend that the wager of the Leninist act cannot be fully grasped as such without some consideration of this other document of 1917, which soon was translated into other languages, and that this document serves as an important historical frame for the section on Lenin.43 Recognizing the "great events" (velikie sobytiia) 42 . As the first mass meeting of representatives of Western European, US, and Russian communist parties with communist and nonparty delegates from Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia to Afghanistan, India, and China, the First Congress of the Peoples of the East convened in the Caucasian city of Baku, September 1-8, 1920, is crucial to consider in this respect. Though it failed to have long-lasting political effects, the congress was nevertheless a remarkable linguistic event, marking the Third International's opening to the languages of the "East" (Vostok) including Chinese, Persian, Arabic, Armenian, Turkish, Azeri, Kumyk, Uzbek, Chechen, and Kabardian, among others. taking place in Russia, the "Appeal" makes certain declarative statements, including those extending protection to the beliefs and customs of Muslims of Russia and annulling treaties signed by the tsar concerning the seizure of Constantinople and the partition of Persia and the Ottoman Empire (A, 282; O, 34). At the same time, the "Appeal" as an "obrashchenie" (the noun derives from the imperfective verb obrashchatʹ ["to turn"]) differs from other documents composed by Lenin during this period that are classified as "doklad" (report or statement) or "tezisy" (theses). Offering something more than foundational statements, the speech-act of the "Appeal"-"my obrashchaemcia k vam"-registers the impossibility of realizing the revolutionary act without Muslim "sympathy and support" (A, 283; O, 34).
The imagination in the "Appeal" of the relation between the Russian and Muslim populations of the Soviet Union does not follow a model of intersubjective mutuality that presupposes (as Song puts it in another context) "a common measure" between the two groups. The relation ought to be read, rather, as a gift/countergift exchange organized by the "great event" of the Russian Revolution. As anthropological literature on the gift emphasizes, the gift cannot be reduced to the volition of any one individual. It harbors an element of strangeness for both the donor and the recipient: "No one who holds the object can ever claim complete ownership; the foreign element obliges him to put the object back in circulation."44 Insofar as the inner content of the gift is illegible, we might further suggest, with Song, that it stands for a "sign" of something to come.45 The "Appeal" describes "a new world [that] is being born, a world of the toilers and those fighting for liberation," but it cannot be any more specific than that: the great events are a sign of the future in the making (A, 282; O, 34; emphasis added). It identifies the "workers' and peasants' government of Russia, the Council of People's Commissars" at the head of this revolution, but insofar as the sublime event of the revolution exceeds the wills of the agents who participate in it, the gift of revolution is both everyone's and no one's (A, 282; O, 34). Furthermore, in a gift relation, just as the donors are compelled to present the gift, the indebted receivers feel obliged to respond with a countergift. It is of this obligation or duty that the "Appeal" reminds its addressees: "When the entire world burns with indignation against the imperialist annexations, when the least spark of discontent bursts out in the mighty flame of revolution [,] . . . one must not remain silent [teperʹ molchatʹ nelʹzia]" (A, 284; O, 35; emphasis added). Translated into Muslim languages, the "Appeal" is at once a plea and a summons of the countergift of Muslim "support and sympathy," without which the gift of revolution could not last. At the same time, it is an intimation that the countergift to Russians will include a supplement: because supporting the revolution will entail Russian Muslims to "ris[e] up against their slave drivers," the countergift will include an offering to the Muslim self. "Lose no time in throwing off the ancient oppressors of your homelands. Permit them no longer to plunder your native lands," states the "Appeal," promising Russian Muslims a gift of giving birth to themselves as sovereign subjects: "You yourselves must be [dolzhny bytʹ ] the masters in your own land. You yourselves must build your life as you see fit" (A, 284; O, 35).46
As a foundational document of the 1917 Leninist act, the "Appeal" reveals that the logic of Leninist translation is a (counter)gift relation. The "Appeal" was certainly not alone in its representation of translation as a crucial practice for Lenin. In his "Address to the Second All-Russia Congress of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East" ("Doklad na II vserossiiskom sʺezde kommunisticheskikh organizatsii narodov Vostoka"), dated November 22, 1919, Lenin explicitly told the communist representatives of Muslim organizations of the East that "the task is . . . to translate [perevesti ] the true communist doctrine, which was intended for the Communists of the more advanced countries, into the language of every people."47 The communist translations of the revolutionary period ought not be considered as mere secondary reproductions but rather as fulfillments 46 . Soviet rule does not grant the gift of liberation in the "Appeal." Rather, it allows Muslim subjects to give the gift of self-determination to themselves. The gift/countergift relation is important because it marks the difference of Soviet rule from other imperial formations. It is also noteworthy that the gift/countergift logic is transformed in its translation into of the original Russian documents themselves. Insofar as the original gift message marks a hollow state to come and a temporal gap, it calls for translation to realize its content. Equally important, the practice of Leninist translation offers a displacement of the tension between the universal and the particular, by imagining a dual birth. At stake in Lenin's writings is not only the subsumption of the particular under a new communist universal but also a dual birth of the universal and the particular in a relation of gift/ countergift exchange.
One encounters this dream of a dual birth in other Marxist-communist movements across the world-for example, as in the camps at Digoel and Terezín, as Mrázek suggests, where the internees, naming their children after Lenin, gave birth to him again anew, or as in Socialist Lebanon, a militant organization founded in the mid-1960s critical of the hegemony of Soviet socialism, and under no direct influence of Lenin. In "Dreams of a Dual Birth: Socialist Lebanon's World and Ours," Fadi A. Bardawil examines the legacy of Socialist Lebanon through a reading of the group's practices of translation and a reading of The Communist Manifesto. When asked in a 2004 interview if the project of Socialist Lebanon had been to produce a Lebanese communist manifesto, one of its cofounders, Waddah Charara, responded as follows:
There was a dream that a number of people had. I was one of them. It was a dream of a dual birth: the birth of a contemporary history from the womb of a local subjective history-an Arab Islamic history whose meaning then was very different from the one it would take later on-and [the dream] that this same history be born at the same time from a general, common, universal human womb. . . . These two concurrent births-and it is most likely that we did not give ourselves the necessary tools to understand them-remained closer to a metaphor than to a concept. And even the metaphor remained foggy.48
Recognizing that all theoretical concepts are originally metaphorical, Charara uses a sexed (and sexing) metaphor to describe Socialist Lebanon's concept of translation, a metaphor that resonates with Lenin's figuration of birth in the "Appeal" (though it is not identical to it). Refusing to render the womb-"the former Heim [home] of all human beings"-as unheimlich, 49 Charara reclaims a suppressed feminine difference, imagining an originary repeatability or historical "surplus" at origin, offering a new conceptualization of the relation between the universal and the local that sits alongside that of Lenin as well as those of the internees of Digoel and Terezín.
Whereas contemporary thinkers from Susan Buck-Morss to Alain Badiou have advocated a return to the "idea of communism" as a practice of universalism or a principle of One World, we propose that we revisit communism as a translational practice of dual birth, not without coming to terms with the limits of its historical realization. 50 The Leninist practice of communist translation encountered its limits in equating the gift and the countergift with sovereignty and in domesticating, in that equation, the irreducible otherness of revolution as an event. Influenced too strongly, even if despite and against itself, by European Enlightenment tradition and lacking in radical "transnational literacy," Lenin's practice failed to account for and affirm the heterogeneity of local social practices not subsumable under a recognizably secular nation form. Fearful of the revolution's own radically transformative potentiality, it molded the singular into a recognizable particular or in some cases effaced it, rather than affirming its difference as universalizable.
Serguei Alex. Oushakine's essay on Soviet Russian children's books from the 1920s and 1930s and Leah Feldman's essay on Soviet Azeri posters offer us valuable accounts of what we might call this "emptying" of the revolution. Tracing the "transposition of the revolution's langue into a parole of daily life" for children and semiliterate or illiterate masses, Oushakine's essay provides a valuable theoretical framework that accounts for the neutralization of the revolution in its translation into a homogeneous set of visual schemes and discursive templates. 51 We suggest that what remains as the inexhaustible promise of the revolution in Oushakine's essay as well as others in this special issue is not the self-identity or presence of an autonomous political subject but rather a necessary relationality:52 insofar as the event of the revolution takes place across a "transindividual" connectivity, it entails a necessary extension and generalization of one's own language-both in the narrow sense of speaking without delegation but also in the more general sense of opening to a relationality between languages.53 Translation is as such the promise of communism, and above and beyond that, it is the event of the revolution, which manifests itself in open, freed communicability. To affirm translation as dual birth, as we have done in this collection, is not to be lost in difference but rather to give oneself up to the common of the event that takes place in simultaneous translation into multiple languages. 
